The Machine that
Changed the World
The Machine that Changed the World,
published in 1991, has been critically and
popularly hailed as the definitive
source on Japanese manufacturing methods commonly called
techniques in this book as the
culmination of several years of study in the field automotive
manufacture. Their research was
sponsored by the International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP)
as a part of a worldwide auto
manufacturing benchmarking study. Womack, Jones and Roos
opened a window into a new way of
organizing the production of goods that departed greatly
from the traditional American method
of mass production. They revealed that a new method of
optimizing a whole production system,
from suppliers to sales, could offer great advantages
over mass production techniques.
In order to establish a context for
discussing lean production, the authors first discussed
the details of the two main
non-systems techniques of manufacturing, craft production and mass
production. This story starts with old
world craft production, which established its dominance in
Europe in the years preceding the
industrial revolution. In that time, finely skilled craftsmen with
general tools made products to exact
customer standards. Standardized parts were not
available in large quantities to
enable large or efficient production runs. Products, especially
complex ones like automobiles,
required much customization and fitting by craftsman in order to
maintain function and quality. As a
result craft production was had very low efficiencies and
resulted in only small numbers of
consumer products entering the upper classes.
Henry Ford’s assembly line methodology
revolutionized production in the early 20th
century by introducing mass production
to the manufacturing world. Unskilled workers
assembled large numbers of standardized
parts into automobiles in a series of short tasks.
Productivity under Ford’s mass
production increased substantially beyond what was obtainable
through craft techniques. Ford’s
methods quickly overwhelmed craft producers because unit
costs fell rapidly with the increased
productivity. As costs fell craft producers could no longer
compete.
One of the most important aspects of
Ford’s ideology was the high level of division of
labor. Workers performed assembly,
while industrial engineers and management personnel
handled line organization and
optimization. Diversification and division of labor went beyond the
assembly plant as well. Internal to
the automotive firm, separate departments designed
vehicles, engineered parts and created
marketing strategies. Many times these separate
entities had conflicting goals leading
to corporate infighting. Similar conditions prevailed
externally as well, division of labor
resulted in very independent supplier firms, manufacturing
sites and dealerships. Each of these
players had separate goals with respect to the flow of
parts, vehicles and customers through
the supply chain. Again, this created adversarial
conditions similar to the political
infighting witnessed within the auto manufacturer. Ford’s
contemporary, Alfred Sloan at General
Motors, created management structures to handle the
diverse interests within a large
manufacturing company. Each division of the automotive chain,
including engineering, components,
assembly and sales, was managed in such a way to
provide an optimal level of
performance for the whole company.
Managing the large manufacturing
operations associated with automobiles remained
complicated despite the management
techniques suggested by Sloan. Often times, there was
little or no communication between
divisions, departments and even between workers. Each
division, group or worker concentrated
on producing their parts to the required productivity and
quality with little regard to the
interests of their surrounding divisions. There were several
problems with this lack of
coordination and communication. Large buffer inventories were
required between manufacturing
operations (and between suppliers and the assembler and
even engineering departments) due to
differing running rates. These buffers were needed in
order to maintain manufacturing flow.
Quality problems hidden in these buffers were often
discovered at the end of the assembly
line requiring large amounts of rework. On the
engineering side, product design
decisions were made with little regard to manufacturing.
Design changes often resulted in
products that were very difficult to build. Communication
between sales and manufacturing was
also disconnected. Assembly of vehicles was not
coordinated with sales resulting in
large inventories of vehicles on dealer lots that customers did
not want. These problems of
communication were of little concern however, because all
producers in the United States worked
with similar practices. Mass production was the standard
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